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INTRODUCTION 
Susan H. Bitensky 
The chronic reoccurrence of mass atrocities as part of the human saga 
is deeply depressing.
1
 The emotional reverberation is not caused solely 
by the shock of such wanton cruelty and destructiveness. For this writer, 
the desolation also derives from our seeming helplessness in preventing 
or stopping the massacres.
2
 
It would be one thing if the impulse to commit mass atrocities was 
locked within the human genome. The sounder view, from a modern 
scientific standpoint, appears to be that the violence has been largely due 
to societal factors.
3
 If science is correct, then preventing and stopping 
violent outbreaks like genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
should be entirely doable via law and education as well as by 
improvements in the economic and social conditions which conduce to 
engendering perpetrators.
4
  
Humankind has toiled and even made some progress, now and then, 
in upgrading and equalizing these conditions.
5
 On the moral front, there 
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has been an inching progress too.
6
 For example, it was a sickened and 
unnerved world which proclaimed “never again” in response to the 
Holocaust,
7
 and, inspired by that sentiment, erected the protective shelter 
of international human rights law.
8
 So, why do mass atrocities continue 
to occur? And, why have they not at least become less frequent since 
1945? 
The short answer is that we have not done enough. We have not come 
close to eradicating the ignorance, brutalization, inequities and injustice, 
which breed génocidaires and their like. Nor—and this is critically 
important—have we cabined the big-power politics which have regularly 
shied from, impeded, or precluded organized endeavors to halt mass 
atrocities in their blood-soaked tracks.
9
 Yet, especially during the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, law has shown itself quite capable 
of making progress in thwarting or punishing political behemoths’ 
various inimical agendas. The Nuremberg convictions and those handed 
down by more modern international criminal tribunals are an undeniable 
testament to this effect.
10
 Similarly, consider that highly-placed officials 
from the administration of George W. Bush have reason to think twice 
before venturing outside the United States due to the censure and 
punishment which universal jurisdiction could visit on them as former 
torturers.
11
 Indeed, the reality is that, post-World War II, the evolution of 
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law has been a study in nations gradually but steadily ceding control over 
determinations of accountability for mass atrocities and related wrongs. 
Specifically, nations have been ceding this control to the governance of 
international humanitarian and human rights laws and to the monitoring 
or adjudicative bodies these laws have established.
12
 
The fundamental point is that it is within human competence via law’s 
instrumentality not only to curb violence but also to curb, to a 
meaningful degree, the power politics which often allows and sometimes 
sponsors mass violence. It may, in fact, be an auspicious time to bring 
our ingenuity decidedly to bear in fulfilling international law’s potential 
against barbarity; national sovereignty as legal defense to mass atrocity 
has been and is losing traction.
13
 Nor is it foreordained that our present 
inadequacies in strengthening international law must be the future’s 
inevitability. Surely we can do better. 
The majority of articles appearing in this issue of the Michigan State 
International Law Review are based on presentations delivered by the 
authors at a March 2015 symposium concerning the roles of international 
humanitarian law and the related doctrine of responsibility to protect 
(R2P) in stopping mass atrocities which are actually under way or 
imminently about to be so. As such, the articles provide a window on 
how this law and doctrine may or may not assist in putting the kibosh on 
big-power politics (and other negative dynamics) operating behind the 
scenes. In connection with these roles, the articles variously address the 
historical development of the law and doctrine as well as the strengths 
and weaknesses of each as presently constituted; some articles also offer 
proposals for reforming the status quo. 
The articles concerning historical development cover such subtopics 
as whether the original version of R2P has been disadvantageously 
watered down; whether R2P has brought any added value to the 
international law on humanitarian intervention; how the evolving concept 
of sovereignty has shaped the law on humanitarian intervention and R2P; 
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whether R2P is too inflexible unless enabling juristic legal principles, 
e.g., common law principles of equity, infuse the doctrine; and the 
theoretical contributions of non-western nations to the development of 
R2P. 
With respect to the viability and effects of international law and R2P, 
the articles include subtopics on whether the advent of the latter has 
made a dent in stopping mass atrocities, with special attention to the 
ongoing situation in Syria; whether R2P has caused an increase in third-
party interventions; whether R2P has eased, aggravated or left unaffected 
the practical challenges often posed by intervening in mass atrocities; 
and whether R2P, in order to be truly useful, should be transformed into 
a duty to protect. 
Though I am merely the convener of the symposium on which these 
articles are predicated, rather than a substantive contributor, I cannot 
resist the opportunity to add a few quick thoughts about the overarching 
subject. For what it’s worth, my own view14 is that both international 
humanitarian law and R2P, in their contemporary versions, are grossly 
wanting for the purpose of halting mass atrocities. I think that the reason 
for the deficit has to do with two interrelated phenomena. On the one 
hand, realpolitik continues to eviscerate whatever potential international 
law or R2P may have to stop the atrocities. Whether within the walls of 
the U.N. Security Council or beyond, dominant states have frequently 
shown hostility to, or a lack of political will for, mounting armed 
interventions where the perpetrators may be these states’ proxies or 
where other national interests make intervention unattractive. In this all 
too familiar scenario, potentially antithetical international law and R2P 
both appear to count for little. 
On the other hand, the victims and intended victims of mass 
atrocities—those who are most immediately in need of effective 
humanitarian intervention—are utterly powerless, under either law or 
doctrine, to demand and receive this sort of intervention. The imperiled 
have no legal voice and no legal clout to trigger the actions integral to 
their rescue. Given the resulting imbalance of legal (and other) power as 
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discussion which is set forth above, will be supported and more fully explicated in a 
future law review article. 
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between major-league nations and at-risk people, it is no surprise that the 
mighty do not intervene when they do not care to, quite regardless of the 
victims’ plight. 
This extreme lopsidedness logically raises the question of what would 
happen if the people’s juridical helplessness were altered? What might 
ensue if, say, international lawmakers were to recognize a new third-
generation human right, i.e., a people’s right to U.N. armed humanitarian 
intervention to stop mass atrocities, accompanied by modification of the 
U.N. structure so as to make fulfillment of this right feasible under 
specified people-oriented conditions? This is new thinking and, 
admittedly, a tall order; it is definitely outré.  
But it is not impossible. It is certainly no more impossible than 
dismantling the social, economic, and legal edifices which once 
permitted slavery and the slave trade; allowed the centuries-old treatment 
of women as second-class citizens; condoned the use of torture as a legal 
aspect of meting out “justice”; assumed the lack of individual 
accountability for human rights violations; and so on. If humankind 
could reverse all of these entrenched and far-reaching societal ills, then 
why not this one too? Basic human decency and a compassionate regard 
for the dignity and physical and psychological integrity of our fellows 
demands that, at a minimum, we roll up our sleeves and try. I propose 
that it is time to inaugurate an approach more immediately responsive to 
at-risk peoples and respectful of them as actors, and not just victims, in 
their own deliverance. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
